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Abstract 
Two-stage game models of information acquisition  in  stochastic oligopolies re-
quire  the unrealistic  assumption  that firms  observe the precision  of information 
chosen  by  their competitors before determining quantities.  This papel'  analyzes 
secret  information  acquisition  as  a  one-stage  game.  Relative  to the  two-stage 
game firms  are shown  to acquire less  information.  Policy  implications  based  on 
the two-stage game yield, thel'efore, too high taxes 01' too low subsidies fol' research 
activities.  Fol' the case of hetel'ogeneous duopoly it is shown that compal'ative stat-
ics  results  partly depend  on  the obsel'vability  assumption.  Joumal of Economic 
Literature Classification Numbel's:  C72, D43, D82. 
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Demand for a good is not deterministic but subject to stochastic shocks, that is, demand 
depends on  some random variable.  These shocks  are usually  modeled as  uncertainty 
about the intercept of demand (as in this paper), the slope of the demand function, but 
more complex configurations are also possible.  By doing market research, firms acquire 
information about this random variable.  Having good  information benefits firms  since 
they wiU  be able to predict better how  large (residual)  demand is,  and therefore will 
make better production  (or  price)  decisions  which  will  result  in  higher  profits  (gross 
of the costs  of information acquisition).  Market research  is  also  important for  social 
welfare, because it allows demand and supply to be matched better. On the other hand, 
too much duplication of costIy research is  socially undesirable. 
In most of the relevant literature information acquisition in stochastic oligopoly mar-
kets (and auctions) is  modeled as a two-stage game.  In the first stage the players decide 
how  much to invest in information acquisition.  In the second stage the choices made in 
the first  stage become public and further decisions  (quantities in  oligopoly markets or 
bids in an auction) may therefore depend on  these choices.  In our view this "observ-
ability" assumption is unrealistic.  How should a firm be able to observe the information 
acquisition  decisions  of its  opponents?  Disregarding  espionage1,  the only  possibility 
seems to be that alI firms publicly announce their information acquisition decisions.  The 
only way to credibly announce the precision of information might be to make the reports, 
received from the market research agencies, publico  However, firms often do not want to 
share their private information.  (See e.g.  Gal-Or (1985).)  Of course, each firm will have 
some conjectures ahout how  well informed the competitors are.  And in equilibrium (of 
a  one-stage game where information is  gathered secretly) these beliefs  will  necessarily 
be confirmed.  But this do es  not imply that the firm's quantity decision depends on the 
information acquisition decisions of the opponents. 
Given the implausibility of the assumption that information acquisition decisions are 
observable, it is  remarkable that the vast majority of the relevant literature has made 
this assumption without giving any justification.2  There could be two  reasons for  this. 
First, the analysis of the two-stage game seems to be easier since it can be solved  by 
backward induction. The second stage game belongs to the class of games with imperfect 
(and asymmetric) information with which one is  quite familiar by now.  Plugging in the 
payoffs ofthe (unique) equilibria of the second stage games, the total game is reduced to 
one where players only decide how  much information to acquire.  However, solving the 
reduced game turns out to be not that  straightforwaI~d after all.  Checking the second 
1 Recall that information acquisition decisions in the two-stage game become publico  In particular, 
each firm knows that its competitors know how well informed it is.  This would imply that the presence 
of spies is also public knowledge. 
2Informiition acquisition was studied in Cournot markets by Chang and Lee  (1992), Daughety and 
Reinganum (1992), Hwang (1993,1995), Li  et al.  (1987), Ockenfels (1989) and Vives (1988).  Matthews 
(1984)  and Milgrom (1981)  studied information gathering in auctions.  Only Matthews did not make 
the observability assumption, while Hwang (1995) stated that it would be desirable to analyze the game 
without this assumption.  Hurkens  and  Vulkan  (1995)  considered  information gathering by  potential 
entrants and also criticized the observability assumption. 
1 order conditions is not an easy task.
3  Moreover, explicit solutions could only be obtained 
for the limit case when the number of firms becomes infinite. We show that the one-stage 
game allows for explicit solutions for any number of firms. 
A second  reason for  assuming observability of the information acquisition decision 
might have been that the authors were led to believe that the results do  not  depend 
on whether the assumption is  made or noto  In fact, Ponssard (1979, footnote 3)  claims 
the latter to  be  the case  in  his  oligopoly  model where  information is  learned either 
perfectly or not at aH.  A1though  most authors did not model information acquisition 
as  a binary choice, they may have thought that Ponssard's claim is valid also when the 
precision of information can be chosen from a continuum.  However, even in the binary 
case  Ponssard's claim is  not completely correcto  Section 2 contains a  counterexample 
in which (for some parameter values) the one-stage game has more equilibria than the 
bvo-stage game. 
\Vhen  the precision of information can  be chosen from  a  continuum the difference 
between the out  comes of the one and two-stage games is even more clear.  \Ve show that 
in finite Cournot markets firms  will  acquire less  information if information is  acquired 
secretly.  This is  the main result of the paper.  The intuition is  as  follows.  Firms gather 
information because they want to estimate residual demando  Raising the precision of 
information has  two  direct benefits,  which  are present  in  both models of information 
acquisition.  It reduces the prediction errors of the intercept of demand and of the signals 
received by the competitors.  Hence, both the demand curve and the production levels 
of the competitors can be estimated more accurately.  In the two-stage model there is an 
additional benefit. If  one firm raises its precision of information (in the first stage) other 
firms  will react les s aggressi vely to their own signal (in the second stage).  This im  plies 
that the competitors' quantities will be predicted more precisely.  Since the equilibrium 
level of information precision is  found  where marginal benefit equals marginal cost,  it 
follows  that firms  invest more in  research when they knmv  that the competition will 
observe it (and respond to it). 
The aboye argument reveals that in finite  Cournot markets more information is  ac-
quired in the two-stage than in the one-stage game.  This has an immediate consequence 
for  policy implications concerning the need for  taxes or subsidies on information gath-
ering activities.  Namely, policy advice based on  the two-stage game will be biased in 
the direction of lower subsidies or higher taxes, compared to policy based on the (in our 
view) more realistic one-stage model.  In fact, we show that even the direction of policy 
can be overturned: For some parameter constellations the one-stage game will advocate 
subsidies while the two-stage game will support taxes. 
Since Vives  (1988)  and  Li  et  al.  (1987)  were  mainly interested in the competitive 
market, viewed as the limit of finite Cournot markets, it is interesting to analyze whether 
in  the limit (when the number of firms  goes  to infinity)  this difference disappears.  It 
does.  This is  obvious if the competitive market with a continuum of firms  is  analysed 
directly: clearly the average precision of information in the market cannot be changed by 
an individual neglegible firmo  However, when the competitive model is  seen as  the limit 
of finite Cournot markets, it is  not obvious that both models of information acquisition 
3This required about one page in both Vives  (1988)  and Li  et al.  (1987). 
2 yield the same results.  As  argued above, in each finite market firms' quantity decisions 
can be manipulated by a change in precision of information of a single firmo  Even though 
the influence is  sma11  per opponent, the aggregate reaction of the market on a change 
in precision of information of one individual firm  could be substantial also in the'limit. 
That it is  not does  not justify the use of the two-stage model since most markets are 
finite. 
The rest of the paper is organized as fo11ows.  The next section illustrates how impor-
tant the assumption of observable information acquisition can be.  VVe  show this most 
convincingly in a simple example that is  not related to oligopolistic markets.  Then we 
show  that Ponssard's (1979)  claim that the two  models of information acquisition are 
equivalent if information is either learned perfectly or not at all is wrong.  In Section 3 a 
general model of information acquisition in an oligopolistic market with heterogeneous 
firms  (of which Vives  (1988),  Li  et  al.  (1987)  and Hwang  (1993)  are special cases)  is 
presented. 'Ve present our main result that firms acquire les s information when informa-
tion acquisition is  not observed.  Vle also show that equilibrium payoffs in the one-stage 
game are higher than in the two-stage game. 
Section  4  analyzes  the special  case  of homogeneous  oligopoly  and  reconsiders  the 
models of Vives  (1988)  and Li  et  al.  (1987).  'Ve derive the explicit expression for  the 
equilibrium amount of information gathering.  Since we  know  that in the limit as  the 
number of firms grows, the difference between secret and observable information acqui-
sition disappears, we  reinforce Vives'(1988) result, that competitive markets are second 
best efficient.  In finite oligopolistic markets, however, firms may over- or underinvest in 
information acquisition.  Conditions are stated under which  firms  underinvest relative 
to  the social optimum.  Finally, it is  shown  that policy implications derived from the 
different models of information acquisition may give qualitatively different results. 
Section 5 concentrates on the special case of heterogeneous duopoly and reconsiders 
the model of Hwang (1993).  Again we  give the explicit expression for  the equilibrium 
amount of information gathered and it is shown that firms  wi11  acquire les s information 
when information is  acquired secretIy.  We compare the comparative statics for  the one-
stage game with those obtained by Hwang's (1993) for the two-stage game.  In most cases 
the same conclusions are reached:  (1) The firm with the higher marginal production cost 
will gather les s information; (2)  An increase in initial uncertainty and a deerease in the 
cost of information leads both firms to gather more information, but the firm with the 
higher marginal production cost increases information acquisition more; (3)  An increase 
in the marginal production cost of one firm leads to a decrease of information aequisition 
of that firm  and to  an increase of information aequisition of its rival.  However,  our 
comparative statics results differ when considering changes in the slope of the demand 
function.  This differenee underlines once more the importance of modeling information 
acquisition in the right way. 
Section 6 concludes and discusses some of the other models of information acquisition 
that have employed a two-stage model. 
3 2  Secret vs.  Private Information 
A very simple example (taken from Levine and Ponssard (1977)) illustrates how striking 
the difference between secret and privaté information acquisition can be.  Suppose that 
Nature determines which of the two bimatrix games of Fig.  1 is going to be played, 1 or 
II. Game 1 is  picked with probability 2/5. 
L  R  L  R 
T  2,4  2,2  T  2,2  2,4 
B  3,1  0,0  B  0,0  3,1 
1  II 
Figure 1. 
On1y  p1ayer  2  has  the opportunity to 1earn  the outcome of the random move.  If 
lleither player knows which game is  played, both players have a domillant strategy and 
the outcome will be (T,R), yielding an expected payoff of (2,16/5).  Hov.:ever,  if player 
2 observes which matrix is  chosen, he will play L in game 1 and R in game II. If player 
1 knows  that player 2 observes the out  come of the move of N  ature, player 1 will  play 
B and the resulting payoff vector will  be (3,1).  In the two-stage version of the game of 
information acquisition player 2 will choose (commit) not to obtain information, and the 
outcome will be (T,R). In the one-stage version, where information is  acquired secretly, 
player 1 cannot condition his action on whether player 2 learned or noto  In equilibrium 
player 1 will  know  that player 2 cannot resist  to observe the out  come of the random 
move and therefore player 1 will  choose  B.  Secret and private information acquisition 
lead to different outcomes. 
The aboye example is of theoretical interest but do es  not have any economic content. 
Hypothetically, it could be that in examples of economic interest the difference between 
private and secret information acquisition is not important. Ponssard (1979) claims this 
to be the case  in  a  linear model of quantity competition with n  firms  and stochastic 
demando  The information  acquisition  decision  is  a  binary one:  one  learns  the true 
demand or one learns nothing.  Ponssard computes the equilibria for  each "subgame" 
where k  firms  are informed and the remaining n-k firms  are uninformed.  He shows 
that the uninformed firms always choose to produce the same quantity, independent of 
how  many firms  are informed,  and that they  always  have  the same expected payoff. 
This is  caused by the fact that the expected quantity produced by an informed firm is 
independent of how  many other firms  are informed.  From this he concludes that " ... 
this theorem makes immaterial whether the acquisition of information is made privately 
or  secretIy".  However,  Ponssard has shown  on1y  that the incentives for  an informed 
firm to deviate from any strategy profile are the same in the two different games, and 
that the incentives to deviate from the all-firms-stay-uninformed strategy profile are the 
4This terminology is  borrowed from Levine and Ponssard (1977). 
4 same in the two games.  But he failed to examine the incentives for  uninformed firms to 
deviate from any other strategy profile.  The latter incentives do differ in the two games. 
Therefore, the solutions of the two games might not coincide. 
To make the point more clear let us consider a very simple case.  Consider a Cüurnot 
duopoly  where price is  given  by  p =  d - q,  where  q is  the aggregate production and 
where d is stochastic; with equal probability it is high (h)  or low  (1).  Let a =  (l +  11,)/2 
denote average demando  For convenience also assume that production is costless.  Firms 
can learn the true realization of demand at cost  c.  First consider the two-stage game. 
If  both firms learn the true demand they will produce d/3.  Expected payoff is  therefore 
([2 +  h
2)/18 =  a
2/9 +  Var(d)/9.  If both firms  stay uninformed they will produce a/3 
resulting in an expected profit of a
2/9.  If only one firm learns the demand it is  a little 
bit more complicated.  The uninformed firm  will  produce a/3.  The informed firm  will 
produce (d - a/3)/2.  (Note that the expected production of the informed firm equals 
a/3.)  The expected profits  are a
2/9  for  the uninformed firm  and a
2/9 + Var(d)/4 for 
the informed firmo  The pure equilibrium out  comes of the two-stage game are therefore: 
(1)  if c > c := Var( d)/4 both firms stay uninformed; (2)  if c < ~ := V ar( d)/9 both firms 
become informed; (3)  if c E  (~, c)  one firm becomes informed. 
Now consider the one-stage game.  Ponssard (1979)  already has shown that the incen-
tives to deviate for informed firms are the same.  He also has shown that the incentives 
to deviate from  the a11-firms-stay-uninformed profiIe  are the same.  It fo11ows  that the 
situation where both firms become informed is an equilibrium outcome of the one-stage 
game if c < ~, and that the situation where both firms  stay uninformed is  an equiIib-
rium outcome if c > c.  But the situation where only one firm becomes informed is  an 
equilibrium out  come of the one-stage game if c E (e, c),  where e:= Var(d)/16.  Namely, 
given the fact that the informed firm chooses  (d - a/3)/2, the optimal deviatio'n for the 
uninformed firm is  to learn demand and produce d/2 - (d - a/3)/4 yielding a profit of 
a
2/9 +  Vm·(d)/16.  Hence, when the cost ofbecoming informed lies between eand ~ the 
situation of asymmetrically informed firms  is  an equilibrium outcome of the one-stage 
game but not of the two-stage game.  In the two-stage game the uninformed firm would 
deviate and learn the true demando  In this case an informed firm prefers the other firm 
to know that it is  informed. 
3  The Model 
\Ve  will  set  up  a  model of information acquisition  in  Cournot  markets which  is  very 
sin1.ilar  to Vives  (1988).  In fact,  the present model wiU  be slightly more general such 
that the models of Vives  (1988),  Li  et  al.  (1987)  and Hwang (1993)  can be considered 
as special cases. 
There are n  2:  2 firms.  The inverse demand function is given by p =  ()  - f3n 2:7=1  Xj, 
where Xj is  the output of firm j, f3n  > O  is  a constant and ()  is  a random parameter with 
mean!1 and variance a
2
•  Firm i has a cost function C¡(X¡) =  c¡x¡ +  A¡X~, where c¡  2:  O, 
Ai  2:  O.  Each firm i  can buy information of certain precision l/v¡ about demando  This 
means that firm i will receive a signal Si =  () +  6i where 6¡ is a noise term with zero mean, 
variance V¡  and with C  ov( (), 6¡) =  O.  The signals received by the firms are independent 
5 conditional on  ()  and furthermore it is  assumed that  E(()  I Si)  is  affine  in  Si.  These 
assumptions imply that E(() I  Si)  = E(Sj I  Si)  = fl +  ti(Si - fl), where ti = a2/(a2 +  Vi). 
Note that as Vi  ranges from O to infinity, ti  ranges from 1 to O.  Instead of working with 
Vi,  we  shall  work  with ti and refer  to ti as  the precision of information.  We  assume 
that the cost of information acquisition is linear in l/Vi, or equivalently, information of 
precision ti costs 
A typical example of such an affine information structure is for ()  and Ci to be Normal. 
Si  could  be the average  of ni  observations  from  a  Normal distribution with  mean  () 
and fixed  variance.  The precision of information l/Vi is  proportional to the number of 
observations.  \\fhen the marginal cost of an extra observation e is  constant, the cost of 
information will  be linear in l/Vi.  (See Vives  (1988)  for  a  description of a  number of 
other distributions that define an affine information structure.) 
Let r  1  denote the one-stage game of information acquisition.  A strategy for firm i in 
this game is  a pail' (ti, Xi(·)),  whel'e ti  E [0,1)  is  the choice of pl'ecision and where X¡(·) 
maps pl'ivate signals into quantities.  Let r  2  denote the two-stage game.  In this game a 
stl'ategy fol' firm i is a pair (ti, Yi(·, .)), whel'e ti again denotes the pl'ecision of information 
and whel'e Yi(t, Si)  denotes the quantity produced by i  in case it receives signal Si  while 
fil'ms have chosen to acquil'e information according to the tuple t =  (tI,···,  tn ).  Let r2(t) 
denote the second  stage  continuation game of r  2  where precision  tuple t  was  chosen 
in  the fil'st  stage.  It is  quite straightforwal'd  to solve  for  the Perfect  Bayesian N  ash 
equilibrium of r 2•  First one solves for the (unique) Bayesian Nash equilibrium of r2(t), 
for  all  t.  Substitution of the equilibrium payoffs  7ri(t)  - C(ti)  reduces  the two-stage 
game to a game where only precision levels have to be chosen.  This gives rise toO reaction 
functions, and the equilibrium level of information is found by computing the intersection 
of these reaction functions, or, if the solution is interior, by equating the marginal \Talue 
of infol'mation with its marginal cost: 
aa7ri 
=  C'(ti) (all i). 
ti 
At first  sight  it seems that solving r  1  will  be more complicated.  The precision of 
information ti  and the action function Xi(·)  have to be chosen simultaneously.  Hence, i t 
is not possible to work with reaction functions.  However, a first order condition approach 
can be used.  In fact, it will turn out that this is  easier for  the one-stage game than for 
the two-stage game.  In particular, an explicit solution for  r 1  will be derived whereas 
the solution for  r 2  can be given only  implicitly.  The key observation  is  that if (t,x) 
is  apure Nash equilibrium of r 1,  it must be the case that x  is  an equilibrium of r2(t). 
This reduces the number of candidate solutions of r  1 considerably.  Only these candidate 
solutions have to be checked against unilateral deviations  (t~, xD. 
6 The  Continuation Came 
As  outlined above,  the first  step in  the analysis of both f 1  and  f 2,  focuses  on  the 
continuation games f 2(t).  From the previous literature it is  known that the equilibrium 
strategies in  each continuation game are affine  with respect  to the signal.  Instead of 
proving this here, we will impose that all quantity choice functions are affine. 
Let t =  (tI,"', tn)  be a tuple of information precisions and consider the continuation 
game f 2(t).  Fix strategies Xj(Sj) = aj(Sj - ¡.¡,) +  bj for  all j  =1- i.  The best reply for firm 




E(O I  Si)  - f3n L#¡ E(Xj(Sj) I  Si)  - C¡ 
2(A¡ +  f3n) 
b¡ +  a¡t¡(s¡ - ¡.¡,), 
b.  _  f1  - Ci  - f3n L#i bj 
I  - 2(Ai +  f3n) 
(1) 
(2) 
The  conditional  expected  payoff  (gross  of  information  cost)  from  responding  in  this 
optimal way  equals  (Ai + f3n)(,T¡(Si))2,  The unconditional expected profit  can now  be 
computed to be 
7r¡(t)  .- E ((A¡ +  f3n)(X¡(S¡))2) 
(A¡ +  f3n)([E(X¡(S¡))]2 +  VaT(xi(S¡))) 
(A¡ +  f3n)(b¡ +  a¡t¡((J2 +  Vi)) 
(A¡ +  f3n)(b¡ +  a¡t¡(J2).  (3) 
Using (1)  and (2)  the equilibrium strategies can be computed and written as  x¡(s¡) = 
bi +  ai[t]t¡( Si - f1),  where 
and 
2(A¡ +  f3n)b~ =  f1  - C¡  - f3n L bj 
#¡ 
2(A¡ +  f3n)ai[t]  =  1 - f3n L tjaj[t]. 
#i 
(i=l,  ... ,n)  (4) 
(i =  1, ... ,n)  (5) 
Note that the constants bi (i =  1,' .. , n) do not depend on the precision of information 
in the market. 
Lemma 1  Solutions  to  systems (4)  and (5)  existo  MOTeove1',  they  a1'e  unique. 
7 Proof.  See Appendix. 
Endogenous Information Acquisition 
The information acquisition games are now  easily solved.  We  consider first  the two-
stage game.  The Perfect Bayesian equilibrium (t*, y*(., .))  of r  2  needs to be such that 
y*(t,·) is  the unique Nash equilibrium of r2(t)  as  computed aboye,  for  all t.  Hence, 
yi(t, Si)  = b'¡ + a'f[t]ti(Si - J-l)  for  all t.  Furthermore, no firm must have an incentive to 
gather any different amount of information. Assuming an interior solution this amounts 
to demanding that (o7fd Oti)t- = G'(tn 01' 
P'i + ¡3n)o-2((ai[t*])2 + 2tiailt*](ooai )It*)  =  G'(ti). 
ti 
(6) 
It is not so easily verified that the second order condition is satisfied, but it can be done. 
(For the special  cases  of homogeneous  firms  and of heterogeneous  duopoly  see  Vives 
(1988)  and Hwang (1993), respectively.) 
Consider now  the one-stage game.  In order for  (E, i(·)) to be apure equilibrium of 
r 1 ,  x(·)  needs  to be the equilibrium of r 2(l).  As  before,  this strategy profile can be 
computed and written as  X¡(S¡)  =  bi +  ai[E]Ei(s¡  - J-l).  The additional condition is  that 
no firm must have an incentive to deviate f1'om  this profile.  Note that firms can deviate 
from  the information precision  and the quantity decision function  at the same time. 
However, given a deviation fromi¡ to ti, the optimal deviation from x¡(·) is easily seen to 
be 1:¡( Si)  =  b'f +  aifE]t¡( Si - J-l).  This fo11ows  from (1) and (2).  (Reca11 that the opponents 
do  not observe the deviation and stick  therefore to their strategies.)  Note that ani] 
depends on i, but not on t¡.  Assuming an interior solution it fo11ows  from (3)  that this 
amounts to demanding that 
2(-e[-])2  '(-)  p.¡ +  ¡3n)o- ai  t  =  G  ti  .  (7) 
Here it is  easily verified that the second order condition is satisfied, since G"( ti) > O and 
the left-hand side does not depend on ti. 
Comparing (6)  and  (7)  it becomes obvious  that the solutions of the two  different 
information acquisition games do  not  coincide,  as  long  as  they are interior.  In fact, 
whenever oai[t]/ot¡ > O the solution of the two-stage game will yield higher levels of 
precision than the one-stage game.  Indeed, we establish our main result: 
Theorem 1  The  equilib1'ium  precisions of information in r  1  are  strictly smalle1'  than 
those  in r  2,  unless they are  zero  in both. 
Proof.  From the equations (5)  corresponding to firms i  and j  .¡ i  we deduce that 
It fo11o\Vs  that ant] > O for  a11  i  in view of (5).  Moreover, differentiating with respect to 
ti  yields 
8 If .  I  oae[t]  < o tI  oaj[t]  O  r  11· .../..  .  TI' ..  'bl"  It \vere  true t lat ~  _  ,  len  ot¡  <  ,101'  a  J  I  Z.  lIS  IS  lmpossl  e m  vlew 
of equation (5).  Therefore,  o~~~t] > O and the result fo11ows  from inspection of equations 
(6)  and (7).  O 
Lemma 2  The  equilibrium payoffs of r  2  are  strictly lower than those of r  1,  unless  no 
information is gathered in any of the games. 
P1'00f.  See Appendix. 
Lemma 2 provides an argument why firms would not want to play the two-stage game 
even if they could choose to do so.  Suppose firms acquire information secretly but sorne 
way exists to credibly inform the other firms of (a 10wer bound on) the precision of one's 
information. Given that each firm enjoys an additional benefit of information acquisition 
if the other firms are informed about the precision of its information, each firm would opt 
for the announcement. In equilibrium firms will acquire the level of information predicted 
by the two-stage game.  Lemma 2 shows that the precision announcement game is a type 
of prisoner's dilemma:  each firm  prefers to gather more information and announce it, 
but when aH firms do that, they are aH worse off.  Folk Theorem-type arguments support 
a no-announcement outcome in the infinitely repeated version of this game.  Given the 
higher equilibrium payoffs  of the one-stage game firms  wi11  consciously  choose  not to 
re ve al the precision of their information. 
4  HOlTIogeneous FirlTIS 
In this section the special case of homogeneous firms will be considered.  Let Ai  ==  A aud 
Ci  ==  O  for aH í. 5  Given Lemma 1 it suffices to look for symmetric candidate solutions aud 
unilateral deviations thereof.  Let i denote a tuple of information precisions where ij =  t* 
for  a11  j  =1- i.  Consider the equilibrium x(·) of r 2(i).  From (4)  and (5)  the equilibriul11 
strategies can be computed.  In particular, xi(sd =  b'f +  ai[i]ii(Si - f1)  where 
(8) 
and 
-e[i]  2(A +  f3n)  - f3nt* 
ai  =  2(>. +  f3n)(2(>. +  f3n) +  f3n(n - 2)t*) - f3-;(n - l)t*ii' 
It fo11ows  that 
(9) 
aud that 
5The marginal cost parameter C¡  enters only in  the constant term of the equilibrium strategies aud 
does,  therefore, not affect  the results. 
9 Substitution of (9)  and (10)  in (6)  and some further manipulations yield that the sym-
metric equilibrium precision of information t*  is  found  by solving  M PV;(t*)  =  C'(t*), 
where 
2  2(A +  ¡Jn)(l +  (n - 1)-y) +  (n -l)-yt¡Jn 
111 Pl-'2(t)  =  a (A +  ¡Jn) (2(A +  ¡Jn)(l +  (n - l)-y) - (n - 1)-yt¡Jn)3' 
if this solution is  nonnegative.  In this expression 
Vve use the notation 111 PV 2(t) to denote the marginal private value to a firm of increasing 
its precision when all firms  have acquired information of precision t.  It is  impossible to 
get an explicit solution for  t*.  Only the limit solution for  the case of infinitely many 
firms can be computed after taking the limit of 111 Pl-'2  as  n  goes to infinity.  This limit 
case will  be of interest in order to compare our results with Vives (1988)  and Li  ei  al. 
(1987)  who focused on this case. 
Consider now  the one-stage model.  Substitution of (9)  into (7)  yields that the sym-
metric equilibrium precision of information lis found by solving 111 PVí (l) = C'(l) , where 
as long as this solution is nonnegative.  Here 111 PV 1 (t) denotes the marginal prívate value 
of information in the one-stage game.  Using C/(t) =  c/(a2(1- t)2), the aboye express  ion 
can be sol ved explicitly to obtain: 
It is easily checked that 111 PV 2 (t) - 111 Pl"Í (t) > O for all t > o.  To  be precise, 
111 PV 2(t)  - 1'1 PV 1 (t) 
a 2(A +  ¡Jn) 
The difference is  proportional to (and of the same sign as)  oa¡foti.  (Compare (6)  and 
(7).)  Hence, t*  > E,  unless t* = E  = O. 
Note, however, that when n  tends to infinity 1I1PV 2(·) and 1I1Pll¡(·) converge to the 
same function.  Therefore, in the limit the difference between the outcomes of the two 
different information acquisition games disappears.  This is  independent of whether the 
market is  replicated a la Vives (1988)  or a la Li  et al.  (1987).  In the model of Li  ei  al. 
(1987)  this result is not surprising.  Since in their model ¡Jn  =  ¡J, which is independent of 
n, demand is not replicated when the number of firms grows.  When n goes to infinity, the 
gros s profits per firm go  to zero.  Therefore, the amount of money spent on research has 
to go  to zero.  In the model of Vives (1988)  where demand is  replicated since ¡Jn  =  ¡J In 
the result is not at all obvious.  In this case private information acquisition information 
has an additional benefit. If  one firm raises its precision of information other firms will 
10 react  less  aggressively to their own  signal.  Therefore  competitors' quantities will  be 
predicted more precisely. This implies that in each finite Cournot market firms' quantity 
decisions  can be manipulated by  one sip-gle  firm  changing its information  acqui~ition. 
When the number of firms grows, the infiuence per opponent diminishes.  Howevei-, it is 
not obvious that the aggregate of these small infiuences is  not substantial. 
Note also that M PV;(O)  =  1\1 PVi (O)  and that 1\1 PV;(O) =  M PV{(O).  This implies 
that when the equilibrium amounts of information acquisition are close to zero (because 
information gathering is  very costly or because initial uncertainty is  quite small), then 
the two models predict approximately the same levels of information acquisition.  For 
low  information cost and high initial uncertainty the models will, however, predict very 
different levels of information gathering. 
ll1elfare 
Firms gather information  in  order  to  estimate residual  demand  and  make higher 
profits.  Consumers  also  benefit  from  the fact  that  demand  and  supply are matched 
better. \iVhen firms receive imprecise signals, sorne firms will overestimate demand while 
others will underestimate it.  As a result firms will produce different quantities and, since 
production costs are convex, they will produce at different marginal costs, which clearly 
indicates an inefficiency.  Bette1' info1'mation reduces this inefficiency.  On the other hand, 
a  fi1'm  gathering information imposes a  negative externality on  its rivals.  It raises  its 
profits at the expense of the other firms.  At high levels of information acquisition this 
10we1's  total industry profit.  The duplication of market resea1'ch by many fi1'ms  also has 
a negative effect on social welfare. 
The welfare aspects of information acquisition are therefore not clear and need to be 
examined.  \iVe need to define the efficient leve! of information and examine which policy 
measures are needed in order to obtain this optimal level.  Since firms  acquire more 
information in the two-stage game than in the one-stage game, policy implications are 
likely to differ with the model we use.  Moreover, if our claim that the one-stage game is 
more 1'ealistic is true, it is important to understand how wrong policies based on the two-
stage game would be.  Will policy implications be reversed, i.e.  will the two-stage model 
recommend to tax (subsidize)  information acquisition when  it ought  to be subsidized 
(taxed)?  Or will it advocate a different magnitude of the same policy direction? 
To  address this issue three different definitions for  the best (efficient) level of infor-
mation will  be examined that are characterized by  a  trade-off between efficiency and 
feasi bili ty. 
Def. 1  The first best (efficient) level of information is  that level  of information 
acquisition that maximizes welfare  when firms use  welfare maximizing quantities in pro-
dudion and the information of all firms can  be  pooled. 
Vives  (1988)  has  shown  that (with strictIy convex  cost  functions)  the competitive 
market cannot attain the first best level of information, unless the cost of information is 
zero.  There are simply no strategies that could yield the first best out  come , since convex 
costs imply that firms will surely operate at different marginal costs if they are to rely 
on  their own private signal.  \iVith  constant marginal cost, however, first  best efficiency 
is possible.  This result is opposed to the one of Li  et al.  (1987).  The difference of results 
11 is  caused by the fact  that Li  et  al.  (1987)  do  not replicate the market appropriately. 
Therefore, from now  on we  will  only consider the properly replicated market, that is 
f3n  =  f3 In. 
The assumption that the information of all firms can be pooled is unrealistic.  It do es 
not respect the decentralized decision structure of the economy.  Efficiency of competitive 
markets is restored if the constraint of decentralized information acquisition is recognized. 
Def. 2  The second best (efficient) level of information is that level 01 inlormation 
acquisition that maximizes we!fare when firms use we!fare maximizing quantity functions 
in production while  inf01'mation cannot be  pooled. 
Vives  (1988)  has shown that the competitive market attains this second best level. 
Since in the limit case firms  acquire the same amount of information in the one-stage 
game of information acquisition as in the two-stage game, we get the following corollary 
to Vives' result: 
Corollary 1  When  the  number of finns goes  lo  infinity,  the  one-stage  game  model of 
information acquisition yields the second best  efficient leve! of information. 
The second best efficient level of welfare is  problematic because it is  based on firms 
maximizing welfare in production. It thereby implicitIy assumes either a policy measure 
in the form of subsidizing production that induces firms to do so,  01' perfect competition. 
A  subsidy  on  production  is  hard to  implement since  the size  of the correct  subsidy 
depends  on  the pool  of information.  The alternative implicit assumption of perfect 
competition makes the criterion inapplicable to finite oligopolistic markets. In perfectly 
competitive markets the second  best efficient  level  of information coincides  with  the 
following criterion: 
Def. 3  The third best (efficient) level of information is  that leve!  of information 
acquisdl~on that  maXl~múes welfare  when firms use  profit maximizing quantity functions 
in their production decision  and inf01'mation cannot be  po oled. 
Given that the third best efficient level of information respects the market structure 
in both information acquisition and production it seems the appropriate criterion to be 
used for policy recommendations. The first best level is  irrelevant since firms can never 
be given incentives to pool their information.  (See Gal-Or (1985).)  Moreover, like the 
second  best level it assumes  some policy  measure that ensures  welfare  maximization 
in production.  Only the third measure concentrates on the pure effects of information 
acquisition and wiU  therefore be the basis for our welfare analysis. 
For given precision of information t for each firm, each firm j  will use the equilibrium 
strategy Xj(Sj) =  a(sj - fl) +  bfl where a and b are determined by equations (8) and (9), 
respectively. Total welfare (gross of information cost) for given t, ()  and signals Sj equals 
12 We can compute the expected total welfare, ErW(t) by first taking the expectation 
over signals  conditional on  e,  and then taking the expectation over e.  The third best 
efficient level te3  satisfies ETW'(te3)  =  nG'(te3), or equivalentIy, 
where Al SV(t) =  ETlV'(t)/n denotes the per capita marginal social value of information. 
This is equal to the marginal effect on total welfare when one firm increases its precision, 
when all firms have precision t.  In the appendix we show that 
\\Te are now ready to compare the efficient level with the equilibrium level of informa-
tion acquisition.  Recall that at the equilibrium marginal private value equals marginal 
cost, while at the third best efficient level of information, the (per capita) marginal so-
cial value equals marginal cost.  \\Thether under- 01' overinvestment takes place depends 
therefore on the relative positions of the curves G',  1I1SV, and lv1 PV 1  (for the one-stage 
game)  and  111 Pl;;  (for  the two-stage game).  We  already know  that  M PV 1  líes  below 
1\1 PV 2  from Theorem 1.  The following  lemma shows  how  the relative positions of the 
other curves exactly depend on the parameters of the model. 
Lemma 3 
(i)  1\1SV(t) > 1\IPV1 (t)  if and only iji < tI,  where tI  =  2+~~~/t3. tI  < 1 if and only ij 
n(l - 2)..//3)  > 3. 
(ii)  111 SV  (i) > 111 Pl;; (t)  ij and only if t < t2,  whel'e t2  is  the  positive  1'00t of 
[(n -1)(2n)..l/3 +  3/2)]t2 +  [n(n)..l/3 +  l)]t - 2(n)..l/3 +  1)2  =  o. 
t2 < 1 ij and only (4(>"1/3)2  - 6>"1(3)n2 +  (12)''1/3  - 5)n +  72: o. 
P1'00f.  See Appendix.  o 
Lemma 3 tells us that the MSV and MPV curve intersect in a point t which depends on 
>"1/3  and n.  For t < t,  111 SV(t) > 111 PV(t) and for  t > t the reverse holds.  The reason 
is  as  follows.  At  low  levels  of information acquisition  sorne  firms  under- and others 
overestimate demand  considerably.  This  means  that  they will  choose  very  different 
production levels,  and since costs  are  convex,  they will  produce at different  marginal 
costs, which indicates an inefficiency.  (The inefficiency increases with >"1/3.)  Moreover, 
at low  levels of information precision the negative externality that firms inflict on each 
other is smaller than at high levels.  The marginal social value at low  (high) levels of t is 
therefore relatively high (low)  compared to the marginal private value. 
Note  t.hat  tI  2::  1 when  )..1/3  2::  1/2 and  that t2  2::  1  when  >"//3  2::  3/2.  Hence, 
when the inefficiency caused by firms producing at different marginal costs is  high, the 
marginal social  value is  larger than the marginal private value,  and as  a  consequence 
firms underinvest. This is  true, whatever the size of the market, the cost of information 
gathering and the initial uncertainty.  In this case subsidies on information acquisition 
activities could improve welfare.  Note that the one-stage game model advocates higher 
subsidies than the two-stage model. 
13 When the inefficiency caused by firms  producing at different  marginal costs is  not 
severe  (>"//3  is  low),  then for  sufficiently  large  markets the intersection point of the 
marginal social value curve and the marginal private value curve líes within the interval 
(O, 1).  Vlhether firms over- 01' underinvest now  depends on the ini tial uncertainty and 
the cost of information acquisition.  To  be precise, it depends on the ratio (74/  c.  (See 
Lemma 7 in the Appendix.)  Fig.  2 illustrates the three possible cases. 
\,yhen information is cheap and initial uncertainty relatively large (see curve C~ in Fig. 
2), firms will overinvest.  Taxes on information acquisition activities could restore this. 
(Note that the one-stage game calls for  lower taxes than the two-stage model.)  Vlhen 
information is expensive and initial uncertainty small (curve Cn, firms will underinvest 
relative to the optimum:  subsidies are in order.  (The one-stage game model calls for 
higher subsidies than the two-stage model.)  Note that for  intermediate values of the 
ratio el  (74 the one-stage game predicts underinvestment and calls for subsidies, while the 
two-stage game model predicts overinvestment and advocates taxes.  (Curve C~.) 
c~ 
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Figure 2:  Comparing marginal cost and marginal values. 
Note that  (72  appears both in  1\1SV(t) and in  1\1 PV(t) as  a factor.  Higher initial 
uncertainty amplifies the difference between the social and the private value,  while it 
lowers  and flattens C'(t).  This means that for  high initial uncertainty overinvestment 
will  occur and that the introduction of the right tax could make up for  a  substantial 
welfare improvement.  In this case the two  different  models of information acquisition 
would advocate very different tax levels and it is therefore important to use the relevant 
model.  \Vhen initial uncertainty is ver  y small, on the other hand, a small subsidy would 
be needed.  The weIfare improvement would not be very substantial in this case, and also 
the two different models of information acquisition would not yield very different policy 
recommendations. 
14 The aboye  results  show  how  the different  parameters determine whether over- or 
underinvestment occurs.  They also show that the two-stage model either advocates too 
low  subsidies, too high taxes or a tax instead of a subsidy.  In  sorne circumstances the 
degree of over- or underinvestment is very small, in which case it does not really matter 
which model of information acquisition is  used.  This happens when (3  -+ O,  (72  -+ O or 
n  -+  oo.  For  (3  -+ 00, A -+  00 01'  C -+  00 it is  optimal not to acquire infol'mation and 
no policy measure is  needed.  In all other cases introducing the right policy measure can 
account fol'  a substantial welfare improvement.  In those cases it is important to use the 
right model, especially when initial uncertainty is large. 
5  Heterogeneous Duopoly 
For  the case  of heterogenous  duopoly  the general  model  of section  3  reduces  to the 
model  of Hwang  (1993).  We  will  show  that  the one-stage  game  admits  an  explicit 
solution whereas  the two-stage game can only  be solved implicitly.  Moreover,  we  will 
show  that the comparative statics results obtained by  Hwang  do  not always  coincide 
with the results we obtain for  the one-stage game. 
Let  n = 2 and write (32  = (3.  Let  t = (ti, tj) be a pair of information precisions.  The 
equilibrium strategies of the continuation game r  2( t) can be computed using (4) and (5). 
These computations show that 
where 
Differentiating (12)  yields 
4(A¡ +  (3)(Aj +  (3) - (32t¡tj 
2(Aj +  (3)(/1- cd - (3(/1 - Cj) 
4(Ai +  (3)(Aj +  (3) - (32 
(12) 
(13) 
Substituting (13)  into (6)  and assuming interior solutions one finds that the information 
precisions of the two-stage game ti (i = 1,2) satisfy  ~i(t*) = G'(ti) (i = 1,2) whel'e 
(14) 
",here 
<Pj  = 2(Aj +  (3) - (3tj  and 'ljJ  = 4(A¡ +  (3)(Aj +  (3) - (32t¡tj. 
As  \Vas  the case for  homogeneous firms,  it is  impossible to get explicit solutions for  tr: 
(k =  1,2).  It is  even impossible to compute the reaction function explicitly.  Using the 
15 implicit function theorem one can prove that the reaction functions must be monotone 
decreasing.  (See Hwang (1993).)  Note that for ti < 1 
(1 - t;)2  G'(tn  (Ai + (3)(2(Aj + (3) - {3t;)2 
(1 - tiF =  G'(t;)  - (Aj +  (3)(2(Ai +  (3) - {3tiF' 
(15) 
After taking square roots and defining Pk = JAk +  (3,  (15) can be rewritten as t; = Ej( tn 
where 
E}(td := 2PiPj(Pi - Pj) +  tiPj(2piPj - (3) 
Pi(2piPj  - (3) + ti{3(Pi - pj) 
is  defined for  all ti  E  [0,1].  V-le  call the curve defined by (16)  the equilíbrium curve. 
(16) 
The solution of the one-stage game is  obtained by substituting (12)  into (7).  Some 
manipulations yield that the (interior) equilibrium precisions ti  (i =  1,2) satisfy Lii(t) = 
G'(td (i =  1,2) where 
Lii(  t) =  (J2( Ai +  (3) :~.  (17) 
Note that 
(1  - tj)2  G'(ti)  (Ai +  (3)(2(Aj +  (3) - {3tj)2 
(1  - td2 - G'(tj)  - (Aj +  (3)(2(Ai +  (3) - {3tiF' 
( 18) 
Hence tj  =  Ej (ti).  The solutions of the two different games of information acquisition 
líe on the same equilibrium curve.  It is  easily seen that for  t1t2 > O 6i(t) > Lii(t)  and 
that, therefore, ti > ti  for  i =  1,2 whenever the solutions are interior. 
From (17)  we obtain 
which can be rewritten as 
Since vve  are interested in the case where ti, tj :::;  1 vve  have tj =  Rj(td where 
(19) 
is defined for ti  E [O, (J2pd({3vc +  (J2Pi)).  V/e will refer to Rj as firm j's pseudo reaction 
curve. It is of course not really a reaction curve because a strategy for cach firm is a pair 
(t,x(·)) where t is  the precision of information and where x(·) is  a mapping that assigns 
to each signal a quantity.  Still, the equilibrium values ti  and tj are found by computing 
the intersection point of the pseudo reaction curves, or alternatively, by computing the 
intersection point of Rj and Ej. 
Note that Rj is  dovvmvard sloping and has a vertical asymptote, while Ej is  upward 
sloping.  \V'ithout  loss  of generality we  may assume that  Ai  2':  Aj  which  implies that 
Ej(O)  2':  O.  The necessary  and  sufficient  condition for  the existence of a  unique and 
interior solution is  therefore Rj(O) > Ej(O).  Hence, 
16 Lemma 4  Suppose Ai  ~  Aj.  The  sufficient and necessary condition for the  existence of 
a unique  interior equilibrium is 
P1'00f  Straightforward calculations.  o 
Assuming that an interior solution exists, we can explicitIy compute it by computing 
the intersection of the equilibrium curve and the pseudo reaction curve.  We obtain 
Lemma 5  SupIJose  the  equilibrium levels of infoTmation acquisition are strictly positive. 
Then 
P1'00f  Straightforward calculations.  o 
\Ve  will  use  the equilibrium curve and  the pseudo  reaction curves to obtain some 
comparative statics results, and will compare them to those obtained by Hwang (1993) 
for  the two-stage game. 
Lemma 6  Let Ai  > A  j . 
(i)  Ej (ti)  is  incTeasing and concave  and has slope smalleT than 1 
(ii)  Ej (ti)  is  independent of e and (J2. 
(ííí)  Rj(t¡)  is  dec1'easing. 
(iv)  Rj(t¡) shifts dO'l.vnwa7'd  when e  01'  A¡  incTease  and when  Aj  01' (J2  dec1'ease. 
(v)  R(tj) shifts downward when  Ai  decreasesand when  Aj  incl'eases. 
(vi)  Rj(t¡) shifts downwa1'd  when  j3  increases. 
(vii)  The  equilib1'ium  curve  Ej(t) shifts downwa1'd  when  j3  inc1'eases. 
Proof  See Appendix. 
Lemma 6 allows us to draw the following conclusions: 
1.  From the fact that Ej is  concave, Ej(O)  ~  O,  and Ej(1) =  1 it fo11ows  that tj ~ ti 
where equality holds if and only if Ai  =  Aj.  That is, the firm with the lower slope 
of the marginal cost function will acquire more information. 
2.  As  the pseudo reaction curve shifts  upwards  when  (J2  increases and downwards 
when e increases while the equilibrium curve is  unaffected by these parameters, 
an increase in initial uncertainty (J2  or a decrease in information gathering cost e 
leads both firms to gather more information.  Since Ej is  con  cave and Ej(O)  :::;  1 
\Ve  have Ej(ti) :::;  1 with equality only in the case of identical firms.  We may now 
conclude that firm i  (recall Ai  ~ Aj)  increases information acquisition more than 
firm j  when initial uncertainty increases or information gathering cost decreases, 
both in absolute terms and in relative terms.  This situation is  illustrated in Fig. 
3. 
17 t·  J 
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Figure 3:  effect of increase in  0"2  or decrease in e 
3.  As  Ai  increases, Rj shifts downward and Ri  upward.  Since R is  fiatter than R/, 
ti de creases and tj increases which is  illustrated in Fig.  4. 
6This fo11ows  from the sufficient and necessary condition for  the existence of a unique interior equi-
librium (Lemma 4). 
18 
• t·  J 
1 
1  t. 
I 
Figure 4:  An increase in Ai  shifts Ri  up and Rj down. 
4.  Similarly, an increase in Aj  leads to an increase in ti and a decrease in tj. 
5.  How is  the information acquisition affected when f3  increases?  Rj  shifts downward 
when f3  increases.  The equilibrium curve Ej(t) shifts downward when f3  increases 
(for  t  E  [0,1]  and when  Ai  > Aj).  It fo11ows  that an increase in f3  results in a 
de  crease in t j. From the direction of movements of the curves alone, however, the 
effect on ti cannot be determined. It will depend on the relative movements of the 
curves.  Fig.  5 illustrates the two possible effects. 
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Fig.  5a:  t, increases when f3  increases 
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Fig. 5b: ti decreases when f3  increases 
Figure 5:  An  increase of ¡J  has ambiguous effects 
In  order  to  determine the effect  on  ti  we  need  to  use  the exact  expression  for  ti 
presented in  Lemma 5.  It turns out that we  can find  parameter values that show that 
the effect  of an  increase  in  ¡J  on  ti is  indeed  ambiguous
í
.  This  is  in  sharp  contrast 
with the comparative statics results of Hwang's two-stage model, where an increase in 
¡J  unambiguously leads  to  a  decrease  in  ti.  Thus  besides  yielding  different  levels  of 
information acquisitions,  which in  contrast to Hwang can be calculated explicitIy, the 
one-stage model differs from the two-stage model in the case of heterogeneous duopoly 
in the way firms  adjust to a change in ¡J.  This difference underlines the importance of 
the way in which information acquisition is  modeled. 
6  Conclusions 
In  an oligopoly  mar1..et  with uncertain demand firms  acquire information in  order to 
estimate (residual)  demando  When information acquisition is  modeled as  a  two-stage 
game, as has been customary, there is  an additional but unrealistic benefit to obtaining 
information.  If one firm  is  1..nown  to have good  information, other firms  will  act les s 
aggressively towards their own private information and this makes their behavior easier to 
predict.  In these two-stage models firms therefore overinvest in market research relative 
to the case  of secret information acquisition.  It was  shown,  that this overinvestment 
íFo1'  example keeping  (12 = 1,  .¡c =  0.001979,  A¡  = 15796.4, Aj  =  0.001  and changing f3  [1'om  1 to 
3000 ,,"ill  lead to an inc1'ease  of ti f1'om  0.01  to 0.112,  while increasing  f3  further to 9000  wiII  cause a 
drop in ti to 0.102. 
20 vanishes  when  the number of firms  becomes  very  large.  This  implies that in a  very 
competitive market the second  (third)  best  efficient  level  of information is  acquired. 
In  smaller markets firms  may  under- or  overinvest  with  respect  to the efficient  level 
of information acquisition.  Policy implications depend always  quantitatively on \vhich 
model of information acquisition is considered.  In sorne instances the policies advocated 
by the two models are even qualitatively different (tax versus subsidy).  Using the "right" 
model is therefore important. 
In this papel' it was argued that the one-stage game is the more relevant model since 
firms are not able to observe the information acquisition decisions of their opponents.  The 
two-stage game would be appropriate if firms could credibly commit to (a lower bound 
on) the precision of information and would deliberately chose to do so.  However, Lemma 
2 showed that firms  are better off not announcing (a lower bound on)  the precision of 
their information. 
This papel' reconsidered the models of Ponssard (1979),  Li  et  al.  (1987), Vives (1988) 
and Hwang  (1993)  in  detail.  There are sorne other models of information acquisition 
that have not been discussed yet.  Ockenfels (1989)  considers a model very similar to the 
one of Ponssard (1979).  The only difference is that in Ockenfels' model quantity choices 
are discrete (in fact  binary).  It is  clear that his  model exhibits the same problem as 
Ponssard (1979). 
Chang and Lee (1992) discuss a model of differentiated duopoly which did not fit nicely 
in  the model presented in  section 3,  although the present model could be extended to 
include differentiated products as  well.  Again  information acquisition is  modeled as  a 
two-stage game.  It can be easily verified by computing the best reply against an affine 
strategy, as  was  done in section 3,  that also in their model firms overinvest in research 
relative to the case of secret information acquisition. 
Hwang (1995)  considers a model of information acquisition that is  designed to com-
pare monopoly,  duol~oly, and competitive markets.  There are only two  players in  the 
model.  The second  stage game is  modeled  using  conjectural  variations.  By varying 
the conjectural variations the model can represent monopoly, duopoly 01' a competitive 
market. However, in the first stage there are no conjectural variations.  Hence, the influ-
ence of raising the precision of information are more or less the same as in the ordinary 
duopoly game.  This means that firms overinvest in research in Hwang's (1995)  model 
even in the case of a competitive market.  The peculiarity of this model is further illus-
trated by Lemma 4 in Hwang (1995).  It says that the level of information precision that 
maximizes joint profit is  smaller than the equilibrium precision.  The Lemma is  mathe-
matically correct, but does  not make any sense in  the case the model is  to represent a 
monopoly. 
Further models of information acquisition have been studied for  auctions.  Milgrom 
(1981)  considers a two-stage version whereas  Matthews (1984)  considers the one-stage 
version.  Unfortunately Matthews (1984)  was  unable to get an explicit solution.  Further 
research has to be conducted for  the case of auctions.  One should note, though, that 
the main interest in  the literature on information acquisition in  auctions is  when the 
llumber of bidders becomes very large.  The question addressed is  whether the winning 
bid  will  converge  (with  probability one)  to  the true value  of the object.  Because of 
the similarity with competitive markets one might conjecture that it does  not matter 
21 whether information is  acquired secretly or noto  However,  this needs to be examined 
carefully. 
7  Appendix 
7.1  Existence of equilibriulll 
Proof of Lemma 1. 
Let  A  denote the n  X  n  matrix with  entries  Ai =  2(.-\i +  (Jn)  (i  =  1, ... , n)  and 
Aj =  f3ntj  (i  -=1  j).  Existence and uniqueness  of solutions for  equations  (4)  and (5) 
is  equivalent  to showing  that A is  non-singular.  Subtracting the j-th row  from  the 
j +  l-st row (j =  n - 1, ... , 1)  yields a matrix B with the same determinant as  A which 
has zeros everywhere, except in the first  row  and in the entries (i, j) where i  =  j  >  1 
(Bjj  =  2(.-\j + f3n)  - f3ntj)or  i  =  j + 1 > 1 (Bj+1,j  =  f3ntj  - 2(.-\j + f3n)).  Subtracting 
Bk+1,kj Bk+1,k+1  times the (k +  l)-st column from the k-th column (for k =  n - 1, ... , 1) 
yields  a  matrix e with the same determinant as  B  with zeros  everywhere, except in 
the first  row  and the diagonal.  The determinant of e is  thus egual to the product of 
its  diagonal elements, which  is  not equal to zero  since  Gií  =  Bií  > O for  i  > 1 and 
G11  =  A11  - f3nt2(f3nt1  - 2(.-\1 +  f3n))j(2(.-\2 +  f3n)  - f3nt2)  > O,  where the last inequality 
follows  from the fact that tI  t2 ::; 1 and Al, '-\2, (Jn  > o.  O 
7.2  Equilibritull payoffs 
Proaf af Lemma 2. 
Recall that t (resp.  t*)  denote the equilibrium level of information acquisition in the 
one-stage game (resp.  two-stage game), and that t < t*.  Let a,e[t]  =  1/(2(A +  f3n) + (n-
l)tf3n) and be  = pj(2.-\+ (n+ l)f3n), such that x(s) = bep+a,e[t]t(s -p) is the equilibrium 
strategy of each firm  in the second stage game r(t, ... , t).  Using (3)  we  know that the 
equilibrium payoff in this second stage game equals 
The equilibrium payoffs for  the one- and two-stage game are therefore 7r(f) - C(f) and 
7r(t*) - G(t*).  Now 
7r'(t) - C'(t)  0-2(A + f3)  2(A +  f3n)  - (n - 1  )f3nt  _ C'(t) 
n (2(.-\ +  f3n) +  (n - l)f3nt)3 
<  1\1 Pll¡ (t) - G'(t)  (20) 
where  1\1 PV 1(t)  is  the marginal  private  value  of information  acquitision  in  the one-
stagegame defined  by 4.  The right-hand side of (20)  is  negative for  t  > t.  Hence, 
7r(t) - G(t) > 7r(t*)  - G(t*).  O 
22 7.3  The third best level of inforlnation 
Vve  assume that  the solution  is  symmetric.  For  given  precision of information t  for 
each firm, each firm j  will  use strategy Xj(Sj)  =  a(sj - f.l)  + bf.l  where a and b are the 
equilibrium strategies as computed in Section 4,  i.e. 
b =  1/(2)" +  (n +  l)f'n), 
and 
a = t/(2()" +  f'n) +  (n  - l)f'nt). 
Total welfare,  gross  of information costs,  equals for  given  precision t  and fixed  O and 
fixed signals s  j 
Expected total welfare, given O  equals 
E(TIVIB)  = 
02  1 
2f'n  - 2f'n {[E((O - f'n La(sj - f.l) +  bf.l)IOW + 
+Var((O - f'nLa(sj - f.l) +  bf.l)IO)} + 
-).. L[E(a(sj - f.l) +  bf.l10)2 +  Var(a(sj - f.l) +  bf.lIB)]  = 
0
2  1 
;¡- - -[O  - f'nn(a(O  - f.l) +  bf.lW + 
~f'n  2f'n 
- ~  f'~na2v - )..11,( a( B - f.l) +  bf.l)2  - )"na2v. 
2fJn 
Taking the expectation over O  gives unconditional expected welfare 
ETH1(t)  = 
f.l2 +  (J2  1 
2f'n  - 2f'n (f.l  - f'nn( a(f.l - f.l) +  bf.l))2 + 
1  (  )2  2  - 2f'n  1 - f'n1w  (J  + 
1 
-2f'nna2v - )"na2(J2  - )..n(bf.l)2  - )"na2v. 
At  the optimal level of information acquisition,  te3,  we  have  ETIV'(te3) 
Define the (per capita) marginal social value of information as 
l\lSV(t) =  ETIV'(t)/n. 
Now  it is  straightforward to check that 
l\fSlI(t)  =  a'(J2 - nf3naa'(J2 - f'naa'v - f'na2v'/2 
-2)"aa'(J2 - 2)..aa'v - )"a2v' 
22)..2 +  31'; +  5f'n).. +  )"(n - l)tf'n +  (n - 1)tf';/2  (J  . 
(2().. +  f3n) + (n - 1)tf3n)3 
23 7.4  Welfare allalysis 
PTOof of Lemma 3. 
(i) It is easily verified that 1\1 SV (t) > M PV 1 (t)  if and only if 
A{3n +  {3~ - (n - l)t{3; > O. 
2 
In particular,  .MSV(O)  >  1\1PV1 (0).  Furthermore, the two  curves intersect at tI 
2(nA/{3 + l)/(n - 1).  tI  ::;  1 if and only if n(l- 2A/(3)  ~  3.  Obviously, when 2A/{3  ~  1, 
no n exists for which the inequality holds.  On the other hand, if 2A/  (3  < 1, the inequality 
holds for large enough n. 
(ii) It is  easily verified that 1\1SV(t) > 1\1 Pl;;(t) if and only if 
In  particular, 1\1SV(0)  >  M PV 2(0).  Furthermore, the two  curves intersect only once 
in the halfline [0,(0), namely in [2,  the positive root of the equation mentioned in the 
statement of the Lemma. 
_  (nA/{3 + l)(-n + Jn2 +  8(n -1)(2nA/{3 +  3/2)) 
t 2 = ------------~----------------------
2(n - 1)(2nA/{J + 3/2) 
This intersection point lies  in the interval [0,1]  only if the left-hand side of the aboye 
inequality, evaluated at t  =  1,  is  positive, i.e.  if 
(n -1)(6nA/{3 +  5)  ~  2(nA/{J +  1)(2nA/{3 +  1). 
This is  equivalent to 
Obviously, when A/  {J  ~  3/2, there exists no n > O for which the aboye inequality holds. 
If A/  {3  < 3/2, for  large enough n  the inequality is  satisfied.  O 
Lemma 7 
(i)  Suppose that A,  {3  and n  a1'e  such that tI  < 1,  i.e.  the marginal social value  curve 
intersects the marginal private value curve in the inte1'val  (0,1).  Then the1'e  exists some 
t1'eshold  Xl  (which  depends on A,  (3  and n) such that ove1'investment occurs if and only 
lfcr4/c> Xl' 
(ií)  Suppose  that >.,  (J  and n  are  such that t2  < 1,  i. e.  the  marginal social value  C1l1"ve 
intersects the marginal prívate value  curve in the interval (0,1).  Then there exists so me 
ireshold :r2  (which  depends on A,  f3  and n) such that overinvestment occurs if and only 
ifcr4/c>x2' 
24 Proof:  (i) Suppose that AI SV and 111 Pll¡  intersect in tI < 1.  Overinvestment occurs 
when t> tI or, equiva1ent1y, when M PV¡ (tI) > C'(t¡).  Hence, overinvestment occurs if 
and on1y if 
0-4  111 PV¡ (t  ¡) 
->  A. 
e  0-2(1  - t¡)2 
The right-hand side depends on1y on n, 13,  and A.  Call it Xl.  Now overinvestment occurs 
if and only if 0-4 / e> Xl. 
The proof of (ii) goes  a10ng  the same lines.  O 
7.5  C0111parative statics 
Proof of Lemma 6 
(i) 
E
'(  .)  _  PiPj  (132 +  2pt(p; - (3) +  2p;(p; - (3))  O 
tz  - )  (  ))  >.  J  (Pi(2p¡pj - 13  +  tif3  Pi - pj  2 




aRj(t¡)  -2(1 - t¡)f3p¡p;(2p; - t¡(3)  O 
---,--"-'=-'- - < 
aJC  - [t¡f32JC - f30-2p¡(1  - t¡)]2  . 
aRj(t¡)  2f3p;JC [4p¡t¡f3JC  - 2P7o-2(1  - ti) - 0-2(1  - t¡)t¡f31 
--,"-'---'- =  < O  ap¡  [t¡f32JC - f30-2p¡(1  - t¡)]2  . 
(21 ) 
The inequa1ity fo11ows from 0-2(1-t¡)  2::  2PiJC (on the re1evant range, i.e.  where Rj(i¡)  2:: 
O). 
To  see that Rj(t¡)  increases with increases in  Aj  note that Rj(t¡)  can be written as 
the product of p;  and a factor that does not depend on Aj. 
Finally, 
(v)  As  (iv). 
(vi)  Rj(t) is  the product of two positive factors  (at least on  the relevant range)  which 
are both decreasing in 13.  N  amely, 
and 
25 while 
8  (a 2Pi(1  - t) - 2P~VC) 
8{3  a2Pi(1  - t) - t{3vc  = 
-a2(1  - t)2piVC - a2(1  - t)t{3-Jcj(2Pi) - 2(p; - (3)tc  O 
(a2Pi(1  - t) - t{3-Jc)2  <  . 
(vii) Note that (8j8{3)(Pk) = 1j(2pk). It can be verified that 
.  (8Ej(t))_ 
slgn  8{3  -
sign {(Pi - Pj)  [pj (pi  - Pj )t{3 + P; (2piPj  - (3) + Pi (pi  - Pj )t{3+ 
Pi  pj  pj 
-Pi(2piPj - (3) +  t(2piPj - {3?p~ +  pj +  t2:  (2piPj  - (3) + 
~PiPj  ~Pj 
e{3pj(Pj + Pi  - 1) - 2PiPj(Pi - pj)t - t2pj(2p¡pj - (3) + 
Pi  pj 
t2.L(2PiPj - (3) - 2p;pj(Pj + Pi  - 1)]} 
2Pi  Pi  pj 
\Ve  may now multiply the term between the square brackets by 2PiPj  and write it as 
a quadratic expression in t.  Note that Ej (l) =  1 so that the express  ion between brackets 
equals zero for t =  1.  Using that Ai > Aj  we find  that 




B =  2pr{3 - 2PTPj{3 +  4PTPj. 
The statement (vii) follows now from the observation that B > O and that if A < O then 
-B/A> 1.  O 
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